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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The case arises out of a contract executed by Enoch Smith, Jr. and D. A. 
Osguthorpe on November 3, 1966, dissolving their partnership. The agreement 
provides that Enoch Smith, Jr. retains certain rights in partnership property. The case 
is brought to determine whether his estate is entitled to those rights and what those 
rights are. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Appellee adopts the course of proceedings set forth in Appellants' brief. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
Appellee adopts the disposition by trial court expressed in Appellants' 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee, Enoch Richard Smith, (referred to throughout this brief as "Dick 
Smith") objects to Appellants' (herein "The Osguthorpes") Statement of Facts because 
most of the "facts" rely on affidavits by D. A. Osguthorpe containing information that 
the trial court deemed barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. 
Therefore, Dick Smith offers the following as the facts upon which the trial court relied 
in making its rulings: 
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1. Prior to 1966, Enoch Smith, Jr. ("Smith"), Dick Smith's father, and D. A. 
Osguthorpe ("D. A. Osguthorpe") were partners in a sheep and cattle business in 
Summit County, Utah. Under date of November 3, 1966, Smith and D. A. 
Osguthorpe entered into a written agreement dissolving several partnerships that had 
existed between them, pursuant to which Smith agreed to sell to D. A. Osguthorpe his 
interest in certain partnership property described in the agreement (herein "the 
Dissolution Agreement"). The Dissolution Agreement was signed by both Smith and 
D. A. Osguthorpe and notarized. D. A. Osguthorpe's wife also signed a clause 
wherein she agreed that any interest she may have in the property described in 
paragraph 1 (g) of the Dissolution Agreement was subject to the terms of the 
Dissolution Agreement. Her signature was also notarized. The Dissolution 
Agieement was recorded on January 16, 1967, in the records of the Summit County 
Recorder as Entry 104566 in Book M9 at pages 327 to 334. (A copy of the Dissolution 
Agreement is attached as Addendum No. 1.) (R. 7-14) 
2. A specific provision relating to the partnership assets and properties 
covered by the Dissolution Agreement stated (in material part): 
"(g) In addition to the above described property, [Smith] 
agrees to sell to [D. A. Osguthorpe], his interest in the 
following described real property located in Summit County, 
Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of interests 
therein by [Smith] as hereinafter specifically set forth: 
-2-
[A metes and bounds description of real property 
containing 577.33 acres is set forth.] 
So long as [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall use said real property 
as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep 
or cattle business, [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall have the 
right to the possession and use of the property without 
compensation to [Smith], but he shall pay the taxes and any 
expense of maintaining the property. In the event, however, 
that [D. A. Osguthorpe] or his successor or successors in 
interest, during the lifetime of the survivor of [Smith and D. 
A. Osguthorpe], plus twenty-one (21) years, in a good faith 
transaction, shall lease all or any part of the property, 
for any period of time commencing during said retained 
interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60 per acre per 
year, [Smith] shall share equally in the excess rental over 
the $1.60 per acre per year. Furthermore, [Smith] shall 
retain an undivided one-half (Vi) interest in all mineral and 
oil rights in the property without limit as to time" (R. 9-
10.) 
(The real property referenced above is referred to herein as the "Property".) 
3. The D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, one of whose members is 
D. A. Osguthoipe, acquired a portion of Property after the Dissolution Agreement's 
execution. (R. 2, 13; R. 18, 13.) 
4. Smith died on November 11, 1996; D. A. Osguthorpe is still alive. (R. 
18, 16.) 
5. On August 14, 1996, The Osguthorpes executed a document entitled 
"Lease Agreement" whereby they leased the Property to Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C. 
for a period of 28 years from August 14, 1996, at an annual rental of $100,000.00. (A 
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copy of the Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2.) (R. 69-70; 79-
80.) 
6. In July, 1997, ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation, succeeded to the 
interests of Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., including its interest in the Lease 
Agreement, which it assumed and undertook to perform. ASC Utah, Inc. thereafter 
operated under the name "The Canyons". 
7. In July of 1997, The Osguthorpes and The Canyons amended the Lease 
Agreement to increase the rental of the property to $150,000.00 per year. (A copy of 
this amendment ("First Amendment") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 3.) (R. 71-
72; 79-80.) 
8. In August of 1998, the Lease agreement was further amended to provide 
that the rental of the property be increased to $200,000.00 per year. (A copy of this 
amendment ("Second Amendment") is attached hereto as Addendum No. 4.) (R. 73-75; 
79-80.) 
9. Dick Smith, the Personal Representative of the Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., 
Deceased, brought this action in November, 1998. (R. 1-14.) 
10. Under the terms of the Lease Agreement, as amended, The Osguthorpes 
have received the following payments: 
August 14, 1996 $100,000.00 
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August 12, 1997 $150,000.00 
August 7, 1998 $200,000.00 
August 5, 1999 $200,000.00 
August 14, 2000 $200,000.00 
(R. 381,390-392.) 
11. If the property were rented at the rate of $1.60 per acre per year, the 
annual rental would be $923.73. (R. 9; derived from computation.) 
12. Judgment was entered June 6, 2001, in the amount of $498,441.02, -
including prejudgment interest through September 20, 2000. Under the judgment, daily 
prejudgment interest accrues at $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000, until the date 
judgment is entered, and thereafter postjudgment interest accrues at the rate allowed by 
law. The Judgment includes court costs of $507.27. (R. 799-800.) 
13. The Osguthorpes' Statement of Facts Nos. 3 and 7 are partly accurate. In 
1966 the record title to the Property was in the name of D. A. Osguthorpe. The 
remaining portion of The Osguthorpes' Statements of Fact and all of their Statements of 
Fact Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,13,14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are derived from 
affidavits of D. A. Osguthorpe, the information from which Judge Iwasaki ruled as 
being inadmissable and irrelevant by virtue of the Statue of Frauds and the parol 
evidence rule. 
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14. The Osguthorpes' Statement of Fact No. 10 refers to a financial statement 
of the partnership which was referred to only incidentally by Judge Iwasaki. Judge 
Iwasaki ruled that the Property was partnership property because the Dissolution 
Agreement declared it to be such. (R. 204-205; Memorandum Decision 12/15/99.) 
(R. 603, Memorandum Decision 9/12/2000.) 
15. The Osguthorpes' Statements of Fact Nos. 23 and 24 refer to statements by 
Blaise Carrig, an officer of The Canyons, which Judge Iwasaki ruled were inadmissable 
by virtue of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. (R. 606-07.) 
16. Statements of Fact Nos. 20, 21 and 22 are accurate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Dick Smith supports his position in this lawsuit with a few core documents: the 
Dissolution Agreement and the Lease Agreement with The Canyons, as amended. That 
is the basis of his claim. 
The issues initially raised by The Osguthorpes were: 
1) The Dissolution Agreement constituted an unreasonable restraint on 
alienation and was therefore void; 
2) The Lease Agreement with The Canyons was not a lease but the grant of 
an "easement"; 
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3) The Osguthorpes continued to use the Property for grazing in their sheep 
and cattle business and therefore did not have to make payments to Smith; and 
4) There was no consideration for the purchase. This last defense was 
based on D. A. Osguthorpe's affidavit wherein he claimed that he and Smith had 
dissolved the partnership prior to the execution of the Dissolution Agreement and 
therefore the agreement was of no force or effect. (Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe, R. 
117.) 
On December 15, 1999, Judge Iwasaki ruled, pursuant to Dick Smith's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, that the Dissolution Agreement did not constitute an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation; that the Lease Agreement and its amendments with 
The Canyons was a "lease," not an easement; that the clear language of the Dissolution 
Agreement relating to the grazing exception did not protect The Osguthorpes from their 
requirement to share the lease rentals; and that the contentions of The Osguthorpes with 
respect to the so-called oral statements made to Osguthorpe prior to the execution of the 
Dissolution Agreement were contradicted by the agreement itself and therefore barred 
by the Statute of Frauds. (Memorandum Decision, R. 202-209.) 
After Judge Iwasaki's rulings and in response to Dick Smith's discovery request 
concerning the amount of money paid to The Osguthorpes under the Lease Agreement, 
as amended, The Osguthorpes suddenly contended that the payments were not really 
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lease payments - they were primarily payments "for the purpose of compensating 
Defendants for their services, consultation and goodwill..." (Defendants' Responses to 
Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories to Defendants dated March 10, 2000; R. 376-
83.) 
Thereafter The Osguthorpes requested Judge Iwasaki to reconsider his grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Dick Smith, and renewed their claims that prior to the 
execution of the Dissolution Agreement, D. A. Osguthorpe and Smith had orally settled 
the dissolution of the partnership, and that there was no consideration for the execution 
of the Dissolution Agreement. The Osguthorpes contended that D. A. Osguthorpe had 
never conveyed title to the Property to the partnership, and that the Property was not a 
partnership asset. The Osguthorpes also argued that the Lease Agreement, as amended, 
did not include all of the terms of the agreement and that part of the agreement was for 
personal services. 
At the same time, The Osguthorpes requested leave to file an amended answer 
and counterclaim in order to assert these various claims and defenses. 
In the meantime, based on The Osguthorpes' admission that moneys were paid 
by The Canyons pursuant to the Lease Agreement, as amended, Dick Smith filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The Osguthorpes opposed the motion, contending that 
the payments were not merely lease payments but were also payments for personal 
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services. Both D. A. Osguthorpe, in an affidavit, and Blaise Carrig, an officer of The 
Canyons, in deposition, stated that part of the payments were intended for personal 
services. Neither D. A. Osguthorpe nor Carrig were able to describe just what the 
terms of the personal service contract was, although they both stated that whatever 
agreement there was, it was oral. 
On September 12, 2000, Judge Iwasaki denied The Osguthorpes' motion to 
reconsider his prior ruling. He noted that the Dissolution Agreement was an integrated 
contract and satisfied the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Further, Judge Iwasaki 
ruled that the Property was partnership property. He then ruled that the Lease 
Agreement, as amended, was an integrated contract, was indeed a lease, and that the 
oral side agreement for personal services was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The oral 
side agreement was also disallowed because it contained no price term. Dick Smith's 
motion for summary judgment was granted. (R. 602-08.) 
Objecting to Dick Smith's form of judgment, The Osguthorpes filed a motion to 
dismiss Dick Smith's complaint for failure to join indispensable parties. This motion 
was based on the contention that the Canyons and Stephen Osguthorpe 
(D. A. Osguthorpe's son) had entered into a contract for personal services (to wit: the 
Lease Agreement) and that by granting Dick Smith a judgment for one half of the 
rentals since the Lease's inception, the judgment would impair the contract between 
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The Canyons and Stephen Osguthorpe (also referred to as "Stephen"). It was argued 
that since these third parties would be adversely affected by the judgment, they should 
have been made parties. 
In opposition to The Osguthorpes' motion, Dick Smith responded that he had no 
claim against either Stephen or The Canyons. Further, the motion was untimely 
because Stephen (a partner in defendant Osguthorpe Family Partnership) was well 
aware of the issues in the case and could have intervened if he wished. Similarly, The 
Canyons was also aware of the issues, its principal officer having testified the year 
before. 
Judge Iwasaki, concerned about the issues raised, entered an order dated January 
16, 2001, whereby he invited both Stephen and The Canyons to "file their opposition, 
if any, to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment within ten days of the date of this 
Order." Upon completion of the briefing, Judge Iwasaki said he would reconsider his 
September 13th (sic) decision and issue a written ruling. (R. 725.) 
The Canyons did not participate in the case in response to Judge Iwasaki's 
invitation. Stephen, however, filed an affidavit in which he asserted that he had an 
"involvement" with his father in negotiating the Lease Agreement with Wolf Mountain, 
that the agreement was for both real estate and personal services and that he was a 
party to "the larger agreement to provide services." (Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, 
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January 26, 2001, p.2; R. 750.) In the affidavit Stephen admits that the amendments to 
the original lease agreement were "prepared solely to protect the interest of The 
Canyons in the real estate..." (Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, p.3; R. 751.) He 
contends that the Lease Agreement and its amendments were not intended to 
incorporate all of the terms of the relationship with The Osguthorpes. He does not, 
however, set forth just exactly what those terms were. 
Judge Iwasaki, in his Memorandum Decision dated May 25, 2001, concluded 
that he was right the first time. Judge Iwasaki affirmed his September 12th ruling, and 
held that the testimony of Stephen Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig with regard to the oral 
side agreement for personal services was barred by the Statute of Frauds. Further, no 
specific terms were ever determined as to just what the personal services agreement 
was. (R. 791-98.) 
It is Dick Smith's position that all of Judge Iwasaki's rulings on the various 
claims of The Osguthorpes were correct. The Osguthorpes challenge each of these 
rulings by Judge Iwasaki, and raise thirteen issues on appeal. Each of the challenges is 
without merit. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Dick Smith, Appellee, objects to The Osguthorpes' statement of the standard of 
review with respect to Issue No. 5 referencing the denial of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss For Failure to Join Indispensable Parties. The proper standard of review is 
expressed in Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989); aff'd sub 
nom. Landes v. Capital Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990): "Ordinarily, a trial 
court's determination, properly entered under Rule 19, will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion." Otherwise Dick Smith has no objection to the standards of review 
set forth by The Osguthorpes. 
II. THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT IS A BINDING CONTRACT 
BETWEEN SMITH AND D. A. OSGUTHORPE AND GOVERNS THEIR 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 
Paragraph 1(g) of the Dissolution Agreement says that if D. A. Osguthorpe sells 
the Property for more than $20.00 per acre, or leases it for more than $1.60 per acre 
per year, D. A. Osguthorpe will share evenly with Smith everything received over 
those amounts. This contract binds the parties. The Canyons is paying $200,000 per 
year to The Osguthorpes under its lease, which is $199,076.27 per year more than 
$1.60 per acre. 
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When a valid contract exists, the contracting parties are bound by the agreement. 
John Call Engineering. Inc. v. Manti Citv Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987). Courts 
should be hesitant to intervene and disrupt a valid contract simply because one of the 
contracting parties has subsequently grown dissatisfied with the contract and its terms. 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica. Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Biesinger v. 
Behunin. 584 P.2d 801 (Utah 1978). 
A. The Dissolution Agreement is an integrated contract. The parol 
evidence rule bars introduction of evidence contravening its terms. 
The Osguthorpes seek to avoid their obligations under the Dissolution 
Agreement by introducing evidence that the Dissolution Agreement did not reflect 
D. A. Osguthorpe's intention. D. A. Osguthorpe signed the Dissolution Agreement, 
his signature was notarized and the document was recorded. Judge Iwasaki correctly 
ruled that any evidence contravening the terms of the Dissolution Agreement was 
barred by the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule operates to exclude 
evidence of contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for 
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. Hall v. Process 
Instruments and Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995). The first step in a parol 
evidence analysis is to determine whether or not the contract is integrated. An 
integrated agreement is "a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or 
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more terms of an agreement." Id. at 1027 (citations omitted). The writing must be the 
"final and complete expression of [the parties'] bargain." Id. 
The Dissolution Agreement is an integrated contract. Its provisions make clear 
that it was intended to be the final and complete expression of the parties' agreement to 
dissolve the Partnership. For example, the Dissolution Agreement, Page 1, states: 
WHEREAS, First [Smith] and Second [D. A. Osguthorpe] 
Parties have heretofore terminated all partnership relations 
entered into by them as partners and have discontinued the 
partnership businesses, dissolved the partnership or 
partnerships that have heretofore existed between them, and 
now desire to settle all of the rights between them in the 
partnership businesses and affairs: 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Later in the document, the parties reiterate that their partnership is over and they 
release and discharge one another from all claims arising out of their former 
partnership(s). (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 4 - 6; R. 10-12.) On its face, the 
Dissolution Agreement unambiguously constitutes the complete, final, and integrated 
agreement of the parties to terminate their partnership relationships. 
B. The Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the disputed 
Property was an asset of the partnership. 
Where a contract is integrated, any evidence in addition to the terms of the 
agreement is excluded if the contract is unambiguous. Hall, 866 P.2d at 606. "A court 
may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract 
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language is ambiguous or uncertain." Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, J9, 977 P.2d 
550, citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); see also, Ward 
v. Intermountain Farmers Assvn. 9U7 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995). Utah courts have recently 
and consistently excluded extrinsic evidence where, on the face of an integrated 
contract, its terms are unambiguous. See Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, iff 16-19, 979 
P.2d 338; Lee, 1999 UT App 126 f 1 9-12 ("The contract unambiguously establishes a 
closing date . . . Therefore, extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to demonstrate 
the intentions or knowledge of the parties."); SLW/Utah. L.C. v. Griffiths. 967 P.2d 
534, 535-36 (Utah App. 1998). A question of fact arises only when the contract 
document itself is subject to more than one tenable interpretation. SME Inc. v. 
Thompson Ventulett. Stainback. 2001 UT 54, 1 15, 28 P.3d 669. 
The Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the Property is property 
of the partnership. Section 1 describes the partnership's "assets and properties," 
including in paragraph 1(g) the Property itself. Paragraph 1(g) states that Smith agrees 
to "sell... his interest in the following described real property" to D. A. Osguthorpe, 
subject to the reservation of rights. The Dissolution Agreement recognizes and 
declares that Smith had an ownership interest in the Property. If Smith lacked any 
interest, as The Osguthorpes contend, the parties would not have agreed that he "sell" 
anything to D. A. Osguthorpe. 
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Other provisions of the Dissolution Agreement comport with this interpretation. 
For example, the agreement consistently refers to Smith's right to receive future profits 
as a reservation of his interest in the Property. (Dissolution Agreement, §§ 1(g), 3; R. 
9, 12.) Through the Dissolution Agreement, Smith reserved certain rights in the 
Property that he already had by virtue of the partnership; the agreement did not grant 
these rights to him. 
The scope of partnership property is governed by statute. "All property 
originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently acquired by purchase or 
otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property." Utah Code Ann. 
§48-1-5 (1953). The Property was brought into partnership stock. 
C. P . A, Osguthorpe's extrinsic allegations relating to the disputed 
Property and his intent are inadmissible. Smith is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Because the Dissolution Agreement unambiguously declares that the Property 
was partnership property, D. A. Osguthorpe's belated allegations that the partnership 
did not own the Property are inadmissible. The language of the Dissolution Agreement 
is wholly determinative. Similarly, Osguthorpe's allegations that he never intended to 
transfer the property to the partnership are also inadmissible. His present 
characterizations of his intent are irrelevant; as a matter of law his intent was 
established by the document that he signed over thirty years ago. 
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D. Even if the Property were not a partnership asset. Smith is entitled to 
his share of the Lease proceeds. 
As a partner, Smith was entitled to his share of partnership proceeds. He 
retained that entitlement in the Dissolution Agreement. His right to his share of 
partnership proceeds is not contingent, however, upon the disputed Property being a 
partnership asset. That obligation arises from the Dissolution Agreement and exists 
regardless of whether the Property is a partnership asset or D. A. Osguthorpe's 
personal asset. D. A. Osguthorpe signed a written contract obligating him to give 
Smith a share of the proceeds upon sale or lease of the Property. The Osguthorpes are 
bound by that contract. 
E. The Dissolution Agreement was supported by consideration. 
The Dissolution Agreement was supported by consideration. Paragraph 1 
identifies the partnership property, including livestock, equipment, cash and real estate. 
In paragraph 2, D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to pay Smith $50,000 for his share of those 
partnership assets. In paragraph 3 of the Dissolution Agreement, Smith agrees to 
execute and deliver to D. A. Osguthorpe "such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as 
may be necessary" to transfer partnership assets. In paragraph 5, Smith and 
D. A. Osguthorpe "release and discharge" each other from all claims arising out of 
their partnership relationships. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 2-6; R. 8-12.) 
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The Dissolution Agreement also sets out various specific partnership disputes 
that it resolves. These include bank loans, grazing fee accounts, amounts owed to 
Enoch Smith Sons Company, tax liability, and responsibility for litigation filed against 
Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution Agreement, pp. 4-5; R. 10-11.) Resolution 
of these real disputes constitutes consideration. The Osguthorpes argue that there was 
no evidence of a bona fide dispute sufficient to support consideration. The Dissolution 
Agreement puts that argument to rest: D. A. Osguthorpe agrees to hold Smith harmless 
in the litigation then pending in the Third District Court by Ed Roberts, Howard 
Whitehouse and Marion Christensen against Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe. (Dissolution 
Agreement p. 5; R. 11.) Pending litigation is a bona fide dispute. Resolution as 
between Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe of that dispute is sufficient consideration. 
Additionally, because the alleged oral side agreement between Smith and 
D. A. Osguthorpe (i.e. that the partnership had been orally dissolved prior to the 
execution of the Dissolution Agreement) does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, (as 
discussed in Section III) it is unenforceable. As a matter of law, the Dissolution 
Agreement is the only enforceable contract between the parties and its recited 
consideration supports the contract. 
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III. THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT TO DISSOLVE THE 
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT. 
The Statute of Frauds applies to this case in two ways. It applies with respect to 
whether the Property is a partnership asset. Because the Dissolution Agreement 
declares that the Property is a partnership asset, the Statute of Frauds is satisfied. It 
also applies with respect to whether the alleged prior oral agreement to dissolve the 
partnership was effective. Because the partnership owned real property, the Statute of 
Frauds required its dissolution to be in writing. Hence, even if there had been an oral 
agreement to dissolve the partnership, it would be of no legal effect. The Statute of 
Frauds provides: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by the lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 (1953) 
The Osguthorpes argue that D. A. Osguthorpe did not grant any interest in the 
disputed Property to the partnership. The Statute of Frauds does not require that the 
writing grant an interest in property. It is satisfied if the writing declares an interest in 
property. In Guinand v. Walton. 450 P.2d 467 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that any writing signed by the party to be charged, which declares an interest in 
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real property satisfies the Statute of Frauds. In Gumand, Walton-Kearns argued that a 
letter did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and therefore failed to convey any interest in 
a partnership. The letter was the only writing on die subject presented. The trial court 
ruled in favor of Guinand and Walton-Kearns appealed. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
From careful attention to the wording of that section [§ 25-
5-1] it will be seen that there is no requirement either that 
the instrument in writing demonstrate a valid consideration, 
or that it be a complete contract in any other particular. All 
that is required is that the interest be granted or declared by 
a writing subscribed by the party to be charged. For the 
purpose of establishing that there was such a grant by the 
partnership it is not essential that its assets be described with 
particularity. The purpose of the statute is that certain 
matters of great importance such as the conveyance of real 
estate should be protected against frauds and perjuries. 
Guinand, 450 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Dissolution Agreement itself satisfies Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. The 
Dissolution Agreement is a writing in which the Property is declared an asset of the 
partnership. Paragraph 1 states that "the partnership assets and properties covered 
hereby shall include," and then lists various categories of property. Subparagraph 1(g) 
lists and describes the Property. D. A. Osguthorpe's signature on the Dissolution 
Agreement manifests his subscription or assent. Thus, the Dissolution Agreement is a 
writing which satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
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Whether recorded fee title of the Property was in D. A. Osguthorpe's name is of 
no legal significance. As the Dissolution Agreement declares, the Property was a 
partnership asset. By statute, the Property was a partnership asset, irrespective of 
record title. Utah Code Ann. §48-1-5 (1953). As a matter of law, a partner may 
contribute property to a partnership without transferring title. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§48-1-7. Once he does so, the partnership owns the property. 
The Osguthorpes assert that the written Dissolution Agreement is not binding, 
because D. A. Osguthorpe had a prior oral agreement with Smith. Under the terms of 
the alleged oral agreement, The Osguthorpes claim that Smith agreed to transfer all of 
the assets of the partnership, including the Property to D. A. Osguthorpe for $50,000. 
The majority rule "is that a contract requiring a transfer of land from one partner or 
joint venturer to another is within the Statute of Frauds." Johnson v. Gilbert. 621 P.2d 
916 (Ariz. App. 1980), citing 2A. Corbin, Contracts, § 411 (1950 & Supp. 1971) and 
Plummer v. Fogley, 363 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1961). An oral agreement to transfer 
property, such as The Osguthorpes assert here, is of no effect. 
The transfer of the Property to the partnership occurred by operation of law. 
The partnership statute provides that property brought into the partnership belongs to 
the partnership. It also occurred by declaration of the Dissolution Agreement. Once 
the Property became partnership property, it could not be transferred back to 
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D. A. Osguthorpe except by operation of law or conveyance or declaration in writing. 
The Osguthorpes1 allegation of an oral agreement, even if true, is of no legal moment. 
IV. THE CLAIM THAT CONTINUED USE OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY 
FOR GRAZING EXEMPTS OSGUTHORPE FROM SHARING THE 
PAYMENTS FROM THE LEASE IS CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS 
TERMS OF THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT. 
The claim that, because The Osguthorpes are using the Property for grazing they 
shouldn't have to split rental payments, is flawed because it takes the Dissolution 
Agreement language out of context. The sentence: "So long as [D. A. Osguthorpe] 
shall use said real property as grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep 
or cattle business, [D. A. Osguthorpe] shall have the right to the possession and use of 
the property without compensation to [Smith]" must be read in conjunction with the 
next sentence, which says that if D. A. Osguthorpe or his successors sell or lease all or 
any part of the Property Smith will share equally in the excess rental. 
D. A. Osguthorpe's affidavit states that Smith's counsel assured him that the 
Dissolution Agreement would only require payment if Osguthorpe ceased to use the 
Property as grazing land. That statement contradicts the Dissolution Agreement, and is 
barred by the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule. 
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V. THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OSGUTHORPES AND THE 
CANYONS IS A LEASE, NOT AN EASEMENT. 
The Canyons pays $200,000 per year to run a ski operation over the Property. 
The Osguthorpes contend that The Canyons has a mere license. However, the lease 
documents themselves make clear the intention of the parties to enter into a lease. The 
original document is called a "LEASE AGREEMENT." It provides that 
D. A. Osguthorpe "hereby leases the specific portion of Property to Wolf Mountain for 
use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance and 
operation of two ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other related 
facilities, structures and roads as may be required." (Lease Agreement, R. 69; 
emphasis added.) Wolf Mountain agrees to pay "annual rental payments for the 
Property." "The term of the lease shall expire twenty eight years from the execution 
date." It is signed by D. A. Osguthorpe as "Lessor" and by a representative of Wolf 
Mountain as "Lessee." The First Amendment contains similar terms. It provides that 
"The Canyons will pay an additional $50,000 in lease payments for the term of the 
August 14th, 1996 agreement" and is signed by Osguthorpe as "Lessor." (First 
Amendment, H 10; R. 72; emphasis added.) Even the Second Amendment, executed 
after this dispute arose, refers to Osguthorpe as the "Lessor" and obligates The 
Canyons to pay "an additional $50,000 in lease payments." (Second Amendment, t 3; 
R. 74; emphasis added.) And on November 25, 1998, The Osguthorpes executed a 
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document entitled LANDLORD'S CONSENT, whereby they acknowledged that "that 
certain lease dated August 14, 1996, between D. A. Osguthorpe and the 
D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (collectively, "Landlord") and Wolf Mountain 
Resorts, L.C. ("Tenant") (together with all amendments, modifications and extensions 
thereof, the "Lease")" was "valid and in full force and effect,..." (Landlord's 
Consent, 1 1; R. 76-77.) 
The Osguthorpes unfairly contend that Judge Iwasaki focused on the 
nomenclature of the documents, rather than their substance. While the nomenclature of 
the documents establishes that the parties intended the document to be a lease, Judge 
Iwasaki examined the issue further. After reviewing the affidavits on file, he wrote in 
the December 15, 1999 Memorandum Decision: "Further, it is uncontroverted that a 
portion of the disputed Property is in the possession of The Canyons who have built ski 
lifts and roads on it. Accordingly, Osguthorpefs claim that this was merely an 
easement is without merit." (Memorandum Decision p. 6; R. 207.) 
The Osguthorpes argue that an easement is a nonpossessory right to use 
another's land whereas a lease is a right to exclusive possession of another's land for a 
limited period of time. This does not address the issue of the joint use of land. The 
Osguthorpes cannot interfere with the use of the property by The Canyons under the 
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terms of the Lease Agreement. The Canyons has the possessory right to the property 
for the purposes of its ski business. The agreement constitutes a lease of ski property. 
The Osguthorpes cite a 1938 Massachusetts billboard case, Baseball Publishing 
Co. v. Bruton. 18 N.E.2d 362, (Mass. 1938) for the proposition that a lease requires 
possession of the premises whereas an easement does not. In Baseball Publishing, the 
plaintiff executed a document giving it the right to attach a billboard to the side of a 
building owned by the defendant. The defendant removed plaintiffs sign during the 
term of the agreement and the plaintiff sued for specific performance. The trial court 
ruled that the document granted plaintiff a "license" and awarded a decree of specific 
performance. The appellate court ruled that the agreement, although titled a lease, only 
granted a license or easement which under Massachusetts law was not a matter subject 
to specific performance. The court concluded the document granted an "easement in 
gross," which under Massachusetts law would entitle the plaintiff to specific 
performance. Baseball Publishing. 18 N.E.2d at 57-8. 
The Canyons does in fact have a possessory interest; it occupies the portion of 
the property in question by having the supports of the ski lifts on the premises. 
VI. THE LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OSGUTHORPE AND THE 
CANYONS IS NOT A PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACT. 
The Osguthorpes also argue, contradictorily, that the Lease Agreement is really 
a personal services contract. The evidence in support of this argument is inadmissible 
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because it violates the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds. In essence, The 
Osguthorpes are attempting to modify the Lease Agreement by allocating a portion of 
the lease payments to personal services. This type of oral modification is a legal 
nullity. 
The Osguthorpes repeatedly assert that Smith is a stranger to the Lease 
Agreement. Smith is no stranger. As Judge Iwasaki determined, "it is clear that the 
Partnership Dissolution Agreement of November 3, 1966 gives Smith the right to 
protect his interest in half the lease payments and provides liim privity with respect to 
any agreements entered into affecting his right to those lease payments." 
(Memorandum Decision of May 25, 2001, p. 7; R. 797.) 
"Privity of contract is the 'mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of 
property.' Collins Co. Ltd. v. Carboline Co.. 532 N.E.2d 834, 839 (111. 1988)." 
Kaplan v. Shure Bros.. Inc., 153 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1998). Smith and The Osguthorpes 
enjoy a mutual relationship to the Property. They are to divide any lease or sale 
proceeds of the Property. Hence, they are in privity with respect to that Property and 
with respect to any leases or contracts of sale of the land. Because the Dissolution 
Agreement provides Smith with privity to protect his share of the lease payments, the 
Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence Rule apply to bar any oral modification of 
Osguthorpe's lease agreement with The Canyons. 
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The Osguthorpes counter that the Lease and its amendments are not integrated 
and thus are not subject to the parol evidence rule. In fact, the Lease Agreement, as 
amended, is an integrated document. It states clearly that The Canyons is paying first, 
$100,000, then $150,000, then $200,000 for use of the disputed Property. This Court 
recently considered the parol evidence rule in Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley. 
2001 UT App 141, 11 18-21, 27 P.3d 565. Glauser and Smedley entered into a real 
estate exchange. Smedley sought to introduce parol evidence contradicting the 
language of the written agreements. This Court rejected the attempt because the 
written document was not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. 
It thus leaves no room for the presentation of parol evidence 
to controvert that expressed intent. . . . Accordingly, the 
trial court correctly excluded evidence of any 
contemporaneous oral agreements Smedley allegedly had 
with Glauser and correctly concluded that '[t]he 1979 
Agreement . . . is clear on its face and unambiguous in its 
terms relating to the parties' intent that Defendant Smedley 
transfer fee title absolute to the [Glausers].f 
Glauser Storage. 2001 UT App 141, 1 23. 
In this case, the Lease Agreement, as amended, is clear on its face that The 
Canyons is paying to rent the Property for ski runs. The document makes no reference 
to payment to D. A. Osguthorpe or his son Stephen for personal services. Indeed, 
Carrig testified that The Canyon's payments in 1998 and 1999 reflected payment under 
the Lease Agreement itself. (Carrig Deposition, P. 54; R. 390.). In short, the Lease 
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Agreement is unambiguous in its terms, and those terms do not include any payment 
for personal services. Parol evidence contrary to these undisputed terms is 
inadmissible. 
The Osguthorpes' claim to a side oral agreement is also barred by the Statute of 
Frauds (for which integration is irrelevant). Utah's Statute of Frauds includes the 
following provision: "[e]very contract for the leasing [of land] for a longer period than 
one year...shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made." Utah Code 
Ann. §25-5-3. Utah courts have regularly upheld the application of §25-5-3 as 
rendering void lease agreements for a period of longer than one year. See, SCM Land 
Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986) (holding that a three year lease 
never reduced to writing was unenforceable); Brown1 s Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 
357 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that a lease for a period longer than one year requires a 
writing); Stangl v. Ernst Home Center. 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997) (upholding 
§25-5-3 as applied to leases of more than one year); W. Daniel English v. Standard 
Optical Co.. 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that the Statute of Frauds bars 
enforcement of oral leases of more than one year). 
Of course, in this case, the Lease Agreement is in writing, as are its 
amendments. The Statute of Frauds requires that any modification to that lease also be 
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in writing. In Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions. Inc.. 48 P.2d 489, 491-92 
(Utah 1935), the Utah Supreme Court held that a "contract required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing cannot be modified by a subsequent oral agreement," and that 
the "oral modification of a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing 
will not be permitted." 
The principle of Bamberger remains good law. "[W]hen the statute of frauds 
requires a contract to be in writing, Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3 (1984), any alteration or 
modification must also be in writing." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 
275, 279 (Utah App. 1987). "In essence, the argument is that the written lease was in 
effect modified to include a new term. However, it is settled law that a modification of 
a contract must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds." SCM Land Company. 732 
P.2d at 108. 
Even if the alleged personal services agreement is considered as an agreement 
separate from the Lease Agreement, it is still barred by the Statute of Frauds. Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-5-4 provides: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, 
signed by the party to be charged with agreement: 
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be 
performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement; ... 
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The so-called "personal services contract" that The Osguthorpes claim to have 
with the Canyons must necessarily parallel the years specified in the Lease Agreement. 
Pasquinv. Pasquin. 1999 UT App 245, 988 P 2d 1, cert denied 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah, 
2000), holding that an oral lifetime employment contract was not barred by the statute 
of frauds since, depending on the lifetime of the employee, it was a contract that could 
be performed within one year, does not apply in this case. The Osguthorpes claim that 
the annual payments, designed to extend over a period of 28 years, were partly for their 
services. It is impossible for them to perform the services in one year. Thus, the oral 
agreement is invalid. 
Summary judgment was properly granted because The Osguthorpes did not offer 
admissible evidence to dispute the terms of the Lease Agreement. 
In addition, there was no consideration for the alleged side agreement. The 
Lease Agreement obligates The Canyons to pay $100,000 as annual rental for the 
property described in the Lease. The written amendments increase the rental payments 
in exchange for the right to use the real property more extensively. Neither the Lease 
Agreement nor its written amendments make reference to any payment for personal 
services. The amounts paid by The Canyons under the Lease Agreement cannot 
constitute consideration for a side agreement as well. If The Canyons is to provide 
consideration for a side agreement, it must be with new money. 
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Judge Iwasaki also correctly held that the alleged side agreement fails for lack of 
definiteness. (Memorandum Decision, September 12, 2000, p. 6; R. 607.) "It is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is 
essential to the formation of a contract. . . . An agreement cannot be enforced if its 
terms are indefinite or demonstrate that there was no intent to contract." Richard 
Barton Enterprises. Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996). 
The terms of the alleged side agreement are indefinite. The Canyons made no 
effort to value the services that D. A. Osguthorpe or his son allegedly performed. 
(Carrig Deposition, p. 38; R. 387.) Similarly, The Canyons made no effort to allocate 
how much of the money it was paying might be for consultation services. (Carrig 
Deposition, p. 40; R. 389.) Price is one of the key terms of a contract. Because the 
alleged side agreement contained no price term, it is indefinite, and unenforceable. 
VIL THE DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE 
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION. 
The Dissolution Agreement says that if D. A. Osguthorpe leases the Property 
for more than $1.60 per acre per year, he and Smith "shall share equally" in the lease 
revenues. The Osguthorpes say that this straightforward provision is a restraint upon 
alienation. To the contrary, it is merely an agreed upon method of splitting up the 
profits after the Property has been alienated. In this case, there is good evidence that 
the "anti-alienation provision" did not prevent alienation: The Osguthorpes in fact 
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alienated the Property by leasing it for 28 years. The Osguthorpes complain, not that 
they couldn't alienate the Property, but that they can't keep all of the proceeds for 
themselves. 
The anti-alienation rules apply only where a conveyance or contract causes a 
later conveyance to be void, to be subject to contractual liability when such liability 
results from a breach of an agreement not to convey, or to terminate all or part of the 
property interest conveyed. Restatement of Property, Section 404. None of those 
conditions applies here. The Lease Agreement with The Canyons is not void. The 
Osguthorpes' contractual liability results, not from a breach of an agreement not to 
convey, but from an agreement to apportion profits after conveyance. The Lease 
Agreement does not terminate any part of the property interest conveyed. The rules 
against alienation simply do not apply in this case. 
This principle was enunciated in Broach v. City of Hampton, Arkansas. 677 
S.W.2d 851 (Ark. 1984). The Broaches sold acreage to the City of Hampton for 
sewage ponds. The City subsequently sold part of the acreage back to the Broaches, 
but reserved the right to buy back as much of the acreage as it needed for future 
expansion of the ponds. As the City grew, it needed the acreage, and approached the 
Broaches to buy the land back. The Broaches refused, claiming that the option to 
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repurchase placed an unreasonable restraint upon alienation of the land. Arkansas' 
Supreme Court said the Broaches' argument was "without merit." 
The language in this deed does not create an unreasonable 
restraint on alienation for the simple reason that it does not 
constitute a restraint on alienation as above defined. There 
is no language by which the Broaches promise not to sell nor 
is there any language prohibiting the alienation of the land 
or causing forfeiture upon attempted alienation. The 
Broaches were free at all times to sell the interest they 
owned in the land. 
Id. at 855. 
Similarly, The Osguthorpes were always free to sell or lease the Property. The 
Dissolution Agreement contains no language by which D. A. Osguthorpe promises not 
to sell or which causes forfeiture upon alienation. Distasteful to them as it may be, the 
Dissolution Agreement merely requires The Osguthorpes to share profits. 
LaFond v. Rumler, 574 N.W.2d 40 (Mich.App. 1997), upon which The 
Osguthorpes rely, is inapposite. Rumler agreed to sell LaFond, by means of a land 
contract, a parcel of property for $60,000. During negotiations over the terms, a third 
party offered Rumler $80,000. Rumler needed the $20,000 down-payment that LaFond 
was offering. LaFond and Rumler agreed that LaFond would buy the property for 
$60,000, pay the $20,000 down payment with monthly installment payments of $400, 
then immediately resell the property to the third party for $80,000. She would split the 
profit on this transaction with Rumler. The agreement gave Rumler the right to 
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approve the sale terms. If he didn't agree, appraisers would be hired to determine if 
the sale terms were reasonable. When LaFond tried to sell the property to the third 
party, the third party agreed to pay $80,000, but by means of a land contract. Rumler 
refused to agree, because he wanted his cash up front. The deal fell apart. LaFond. 
574 N.W.2d at 41-42. 
The LaFond court said this was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because it 
gave the appraiser control over the sales price. "The appraiser may decide that the 
property is worth more than a new purchaser is willing to pay, hence disrupting a 
prospective sale and in effect creating an unreasonable restraint on alienation." Id. at 
456. 
No such consideration is at play in this case. The Osguthorpes alone decided to 
lease the Property, and are now receiving $200,000 per year for it. Smith had no 
control over the lease and could not disrupt a prospective good faith sale or lease. It is 
also interesting to note that LaFond does not hold that the circumstances were a 
restraint on alienation, but that they "in effect" created a restraint. Utah has not 
expanded its law to prohibit "effective" unreasonable restraints on alienation. Under 
LaFond. real estate partners can still split profits, they just can't defer to an appraiser 
the final determination of the sales price. 
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Osguthorpe also cites White v. White. 251 A.2d 470 (NJ. Super. 1969) in 
support of his contention. In White, a man left his house to his grandnephew, with a 
provision in his will that if the grandnephew sold the house within 15 years he would 
split the proceeds with his brother and sister. The house caught fire, causing the great-
uncle's death. The grandnephew and his siblings squabbled over whether the fire 
insurance proceeds should be distributed as being equivalent to a "sale" of the property, 
or whether they should be used to repair the property. The New Jersey Court held that 
the provision in the will was invalid. White. 251 A.2d at 474. 
White v. White is not a Utah case and should not be applied beyond its facts. It 
is distinguishable from this case in at least four ways. First, it did not involve the 
dissolution of a partnership. Second, it did not involve a contract. Third, it was not 
based on an agreement by the party to be restricted. Fourth, it involved suburban 
residential property not under-eloped rural pastures. These distinctions are significant, 
because Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe reached an agreement about a fair distribution of 
partnership assets. In White, the court was forced to determine what a testator would 
have done with insurance proceeds had he lived. No such speculation is required here 
because Smith and D. A. Osguthorpe expressed their agreement in writing. 
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VIII. STEPHEN OSGUTHORPE AND THE CANYONS ARE NOT 
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
The Osguthorpes moved to dismiss Dick Smith's complaint on the ground that 
Stephen Osguthorpe, (also referred to as "Stephen") and The Canyons were 
indispensable parties under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge 
Iwasaki denied the motion, but invited Stephen Osguthorpe and The Canyons to oppose 
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment, if they chose. The Canyons did not. Stephen, 
however, filed a memorandum opposing summary judgment which was considered by 
the trial court. "Ordinarily, a trial court's determination properly entered under Rule 
19 will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 
767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989): aff'dsub nom. Landes v. Capital Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 
1127 (Utah 1990). Judge Iwasaki did not abuse his discretion. 
If The Osguthorpes felt that Stephen and The Canyons were truly indispensable 
parties to the litigation, they should have named them. In Landes v. Capital City Bank. 
795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), Landes argued that the SBA should have been joined as an 
indispensable party. The Supreme Court noted that if Landes had been concerned 
about the absence of the SBA, he could have included the SBA as a defendant in the 
original complaint, or he could have requested leave to amend under Rule 15. "Having 
himself failed to join the SBA, Landes cannot now complain that the court's failure to 
require joinder of the SBA is reversible error." Landes. 795 P.2d at 1132. 
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Stephen is a general partner in the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership. The 
Family Partnership appeared in this lawsuit and has always been represented by 
counsel. Stephen sat at counsel table at some of the hearings as a representative of the 
Family Partnership. He was fully apprised of the conduct of the litigation. He knew 
that Dick Smith sought to recover his half of the lease payments. Despite this 
knowledge, Stephen took no action to join the lawsuit personally nor to seek joinder of 
The Canyons. 
Rule 19(a)(2) allows joinder where there is a substantial risk of inconsistent 
obligations. However, no substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations exists 
where there is only a risk of a frivolous lawsuit or where the absent party has no cause 
of action against the parties already named. Boczon v. Northwestern Elevator Co., 
Inc., 652 F.Supp. 1482, 1487 (E.D.Wis. 1987). 
The Canyons has no claim against Stephen Osguthorpe under the Lease 
Agreement. As Judge Iwasaki rightly found on summary judgment, the Lease 
Agreement is an integrated contract, which unambiguously provides that The Canyons 
will pay $200,000 per year to The Osguthorpes for the right to use the described real 
estate. A claim by The Canyons that the Lease Agreement also requires Stephen 
Osguthorpe (or anyone else) to perform personal services would fail for the reasons 
stated above - i.e., the Statute of Frauds, the parole evidence rule, and lack of 
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consideration. The Canyons would also fail in a claim against Stephen Osguthorpe for 
personal services because the alleged side agreement was indefinite: "the lack of any 
price term makes this side agreement unenforceable." (Memorandum Decision, 
September 12, 2000, page 6; R. 607.) 
IX. JUDGE IWASAKI PROPERLY DENIED AMENDMENT. 
The Osguthorpes sought to amend their answer to assert a counterclaim. Judge 
Iwasaki denied his motion because the claims The Osguthorpes sought to assert were 
disposed of by Dick Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment. Under Rule 15 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court's decision about amendment is granted 
deference, and is overturned only if it was an abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. Corp. 
v. Benson. 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). In their Brief, The Osguthorpes state that it 
would be an abuse of discretion to deny amendment if this case is remanded. If the 
case is not remanded, the issue is moot. If it is remanded, The Osguthorpes can seek to 
amend, and Judge Iwasaki can make a determination based on the circumstances then 
existing. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment entered below should be affirmed. 
DATED this 7 "day of March, 2002. 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
3 By 
Hardin A. Whitney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By /£{U Avlfc 
Robert G. Wing ] 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
. u w JJ...7. I 
R E r o ^ - ^ l - 1 6 - 6 7 cJ.?:l To.-o 3.27-3 
REQ';:;V
 cf .^9Ile..^...n°lh '. ! 
FEE , n „ „ WANOA Y. I'pjcc:, sui.:f.:ii- cp/r.roxor.'! $ 10.T™ -- C y A w k ^ W ^ I 
INDEXliO j L o _ ABSTRACT # . ^ ( 
A G R E E M E N T 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered in to th i s p ~~* 
day of November, 1966, by and between ENOCH 8MITH, JR., of Sa l t 
Lake Ci ty , Utah, here inaf ter referred to as F irs t Party, and 
D# A. OSGUTHORPE, of Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, here in-
a f t e r referred to as Second Party, 
N I T N B 8 6 B T H 1 
WHEREAS, F i r s t and Second Part i e s , for over ten (10) 
years were partners primarily engaged in the c a t t l e and sheep 
b u s i n e s s e s , having operated under the partnership names of 
Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, and Aveneen Partner-
s h i p , and as Red Pine Land & Livestock Company, and in some 
i n s t a n c e s operated some portions of the partnership businesses 
under t h e i r ind iv idua l names without d i sc los ing the partnership 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between them; and 
WHEREAS, F i r s t and Second Part ies have heretofore 
terminated a l l partnership re la t ions entered in to by them as 
partners and have discontinued the partnership bus inesses , 
d i s s o l v e d the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore 
e x i s t e d between them, and now des ire t o s e t t l e a l l of the r ight s 
between them in the partnership businesses and a f f a i r s ; ^ 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between U"\ 
First and Second Parties as follows s 
Except as hereinafter reserved to First Party, First 
Party agrees to s e l l to Second Party a l l of First Party's y^ 
O 
right , t i t l e , interest and estate in and to a l l partnership Q 
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assets, and Second Party agrees to purchase from First Party 
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in and to 
all partnership assets upon the following terms and conditions, 
to-witi 
1. The partnership assets and properties covered 
hereby shall includei 
(a) Any cash on hand and all accounts receivable 
this datej 
(b) All sheep, including ewes, bucks and lambs, 
together with all registered brands and markings; 
(c) All grazing permits and rights, including 
the Grazing Permit* located within what is known and desig-
nated by the Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Department of 
the Interior as the Fillmore, Utah, Grazing District, hereto-
fore purchased from T, Tracy Wright, together with the right 
to purchase an additional 500 head of sheep Permit or License 
as provided in the Agreement dated the 24th day of October, 
1961, between the said T. Tracy Wright, as Seller, and the 
parties hereto as Buyers; Wasatch National Forest Permits for 
619 head of sheep; United States Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management, License for Taylor Grazing Rights, 
Park City Area-Summit, U, number and class 60 S, Unit 72; c o 
(d) All Leases, including State of Utah Public 
Land Lease No. 10925, covering 487.28 acres in Section 2, K.X 
Township 2 South, Range 3 Bast, Summit County, Utah; 
Grazing Lease from Edward Bagley and Irvin T. Nelson, ^ " 
covering property located in Salt Lake County, Utah; o 
(e) All horses and other animals, if any, in 
addition to the sheep; 
O 
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(f) All trucks, machinery and equipment; 
(g) In addition to the above described property, 
First Party agrees to sell to 8econd Party, his interest in 
the following described real property located in Summit 
County, Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of in-
terests therein by First Party as hereinafter specifically 
sot forthi 
Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Sec. 1; T. 2 8., R. 3 E., 
\ Salt Lake Meridian. 
Lota, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the BE quarter of 
Y( Sec^ 3, T. 2 8« R. 3 B«, Salt Lake Base and 
^ Meridian. 
j ' Beginning at a point 1208.5 feet South l°48l 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 1, 
Township 2 8outh, Range 3 Bast, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, running thence South 1*48' West 
2 feet, thence South 36*08* West 168.7 feet, 
thence North 89°50* West 3082.6 feet, thence 
North O ^ 1 Bast 139.2 feet, thence South 
89°50' East 3177.6 feet to point of beginning, 
containing 10 acres. 
Total acres 577.33, more or less. 
So long as Second Party shall use said real property as 
grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or 
cattle business, Second Party shall have the right to the posses-
sion and use of the property without compensation to First Party, 
but he shall pay the taxes and any expense of maintairing the 
property. In the event, however, that Second Party or his 
successor or successors in interest, during the lifetime of the ~T\ 
survivor of First and Second Parties, plus twenty-one (21) years,
 Li , 
c. 
in a good faith transaction, shall sell the property, or any part <r 
i — 
thereof at a price exceeding Twenty Dollars ($20,00) per acre, 
plus the depreciated cost of any fencing that Second Party may ^ 
^1 
have caused to be done on the property, then First Party shall CD 
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share equally with Second Party in the sales price paid over 
Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per acre, plus said depreciated fencing 
cost, and if, during said period of time he, or his successor 
or successors in interest in the property shall lease all or any 
part of the property, for any period of time commencing during 
said retained interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60 
per acre per year. First Party shall share equally in the excess 
rental over the $1.60 per acre per year. Furthermore, Party of 
the First Part shall retain an undivided one-half (1/2) interest 
in all mineral and oil rights in the property without limit as 
to time. 
2. Second Party agrees to pay First Party for his 
interest in the above described property, and in settlement of 
all claims heretofore existing between the parties arising out 
of any of the partnership business or businesses, the sum of 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) cash, payment thereof to be 
made within thirty (30) days from date hereof. In addition to 
the payment of said Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) to First 
Party, Second Party agrees to assume, pay and otherwise perform 
all of the outstanding obligations of the partnership businesses, 
whether incurred under the name of Av & En, Aveneen Land & Live-
stock Company, Aveneen Partnership, Red Pine Land & Livestock 
O 
Company, or in any other names, including the personal names of 
the parties hereto. Specifically included in these obligations, ,_~ 
but not excluding any other obligations, are any and all bank c-
loans, including the amounts owing Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
the loan made by Utah Livestock Production Credit Association, v^ 
O 
the accounts owing for grazing fees to Bothwell and Swanner Co. ° 
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r?hzf^\&$QTic$J and to Edward Bagley and Irvin T. Nelson on the ir 
grazing l e a s e , and every and a l l other ob l iga t ions of any of 
the s a i d partnerships , whether or not s p e c i f i c a l l y s e t forth 
h e r e i n ; except , that Second Party w i l l not assume any indebted-
ness owing by any of the said partnerships to Enoch Smith Sons 
Company on account of work done by said company for the partner*-
s h i p a , except that Second Party s h a l l pay Enoch Smith Sons 
Company for the advance made by i t on account of lease fees to 
Bothwell and Swanner Co. in the sum of $2 ,176 .50 . Further, Second 
party agrees to assume any income tax l i a b i l i t y for the current 
year and on account of any audits that may hereaf ter be made of 
the income tax returns heretofore f i l e d covering the partner-
sh ip bus iness or b u s i n e s s e s . Provided, however, that F i r s t Party 
w i l l r e t a i n a l l of h i s books, records and other accounts r e l a t i n g 
t o the partnership businesses for a period of at l e a s t s i x years , 
and w i l l f u l l y cooperate with Second Party in connection with any 
aud i t s or other quest ions raised in connection with the partner-
s h i p s ' income tax re turns . Further, Second Party agrees to save 
F i r s t Party harmless on account of that cer ta in s u i t brought in 
the D i s t r i c t Court of Summit County, by Ed Roberts, Howard ^ 
K^ 
Whitehouse and Marion Chriatenaen, as p l a i n t i f f s , against F i r s t J^J 
and Second P a r t i e s , Case No. 3527. Second Party t o assume the < a 
defense of the a c t i o n on behalf of both himself and F irs t Party, 
cr-
and t o pay a l l c o s t s and expenses, including a t torneys ' fees 2^r 
that Second Party may incur in defense of the ac t ion and any CD 
O 
OP 
judgment that the plaintiffs in said action, or any of them, 
may obtain against First Party. 
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3. Upon payment in full of the purchase price to be 
paid by Second Party to First Party as hereinabove in paragraph 
2 provided, First Party agrees to execute and deliver to Second 
Party such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be neces-
sary to transfer and convey to Second Party all of the interest 
in the partnership businesses of First Party as hereinabove 
provided, with the exception of the interests retained by him 
in the real property specifically hereinabove described in 
paragraph 1 (g) . 
4. The parties hereto agree that the Partnerships 
heretofore existing between them have been dissolved as of the 
17th day of January, 1966, effective January 1, 1966, and notice 
thereof has heretofore been published as provided by law. Neither 
party has authority to wind up partnership affairs and Second 
Party, by this Agreement, has succeeded to all of said partner-
ship affairs upon the terms and conditions hereinabove set forth. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the 
parties hereto do hereby release and discharge one another from 
all claims of whatsoever nature arising out of their former 
partnership relationships. ^ 
WITNESS the execution hereof by the parties hereto, 
the year and day hereinabove first written. 
EXHIBIT A pg. 6 
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STATB OF UTAH, ) 
) 8 8 , 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE, ) 
On the 3 - day of fJVyUu/f^ . 1966, p e r s o n a l l y 
.appeared before me ENOCH SMITH, JR. one of the s i g n e r s of the 
y'x^l L£fl£ove- i n s t rumen t , who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed 
lV\*« 
• Notary mibli 
Residing in S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 88. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ) 
On the 3 ~ day of //fsft~ftU**£c^/~. 1966, personally 
appeared before me D. A. OSGUTHORPE, one of the signers of the 
,«^K(\Vfl?J5»6vfi instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed 
f A 
' f\ -*:-x/-• * N o t a r y Pi 
R e s i d i n g i n S a l t I&ke C o u n t y , U t a h 
I , AFTON S , OSGUTHORPE, t h e w i f e o f D. A. O s g u t h o r p e , K \ 
Second p a r t y i n t h e f o r e g o i n g Agreemen t , do h e r e b y a p p r o v e t h e [••-; 
a b o v e a n d f o r e g o i n g Agreement and a g r e e t h a t any i n t e r e s t t h a t 
I may h a v e i n and t o t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n p a r a g r a p h <J~ 
1 (g) o f t h e Agreemen t s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f ^ 
CD 
s a i d p a r a g r a p h 1 (g) and t h e o t h e r a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e CO 
f o r e g o i n g A g r e e m e n t -
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-'Py S^-^nrijLZaLL.. 1966. 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) as, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ) 
* 
X'^X.-:''""?'??""""'• »"° 1°ly ==kno»l6agoa to m that .y. 
•/<.;•.,?'; % V V * r "* t h a t 8h® executed 
A ^ 
Notary ifvbli 
Residing in Salt iZake County.utah 
B00KM9 P.ARF3"54 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
i-LAifc AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made bv and between n A n t r . m , 
OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERS^ ,< ? O S G U T H O R P E and D.A 
RESORTS, L.C.«lessee. O A ^ S c ^ ^ ^ M 0 U ^ A I N 
described ,n E*h,bi, "A" ( h e r e t n a n S ^ Z ^ r P ^ 
approximately 560 acres. Wolf Mountain is a ski/sunL P ^ * c o n s i s t " g of 
intends to expand fts operation to the pTperry. ' ""* ° p e r a t o r «* 
and Doc's Knob chair life as i ^ S f f Speafietfj,
 S a d d I c b 
Doc's Knob and lower sliver rtte^Z^l ^ " ' " ^ M t r a i l s s ^ i n g 
"A". Notwithstanding the rigte « S w X ^ i d e n t £ f i e d o n E ^ i f 
shall be pennmed to i n r p r c v e l n V C £ I T ^ ^ T ^ ° W h o ^ 
improvement or use does not interfere with S l ^ ' * " * 
of Lessee. Ski trails lifts a„d feciH»„Th,llfT wi*™l* structures and runs 
« (40 acres) and « " < « ^ ^ ^ J ^ E S ? f T ™ ™ 
Property descnbed in Exhibit "A" paragraph 1. d ° f Ule 
Wolf Mountain shall pay to D A rkomr^™ i 
Property in the a m o i i j ' i ^ S S S ^ S S S T , « " ? 
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, te/ycSy of A u ^ 19% 
D.A. Osgufro 
WITNESS 
y Panncrsl 
ffltfi// Gu*uu- 0 0 4 6 0 5 9 2 EK009SS PG00780 
£XH/fi/7 
"B" 
'?&CT[OH °? 
-i>eoTlONi -2. 
£*H/PtT A 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
£ enca 
; Skiin 
Lompa 
The following agreement amends and clarifies the existing agreement dated the 14th day 
of August, 1996 between Wolf Mountain (now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family: 
1) The Canyons will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top 
of Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of 
Saddleback area. The road will also be continued from the top of 
Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. Steve Osguthorpe and 
Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment prior to construction. 
2) The Canyons will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback 
lift to the location approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
3) The Canyons will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail 
construction as approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig. 
4) The Canyons are able to relocate and upgrade the existing 
Spotted Owl chair to the location shown on the attached map. This 
relocation to be approved by and Blaise Carrig and Steve Osguthorpe. 
5) The Canyons will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on 
Osguthorpe property as shown on the attached map for 
construction and maintenance access. 
Killington, VT 
Sunday River, M£ 
Sugzrbu$h, VT 
Mount Snow, VT 
Haystack. VT 
SugzrloafAJSA. M£ 
Atttosh Bear Pezkt 
Pico. VT 
6) The Canyons will construct and maintain a road on Osguthorpe 
property from Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is 
to be used by the Canyons construction and maintenance only. 
7) The Canyons commits to working with the Osguthorpe family to 
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for 
the entire terms of this agreement. The Canyons committed to 
working with the Osguthorpes to resolve any issues of the 
interference or conflict between these operations and the ski 
development. 
8) The Canyons can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west corner 
of lot 5 of the Osguthorpe property quarter section. This trail to be 
approved by Steve Osguthorpe and and Blaise Carrig 
9) The Canyons will include the Osguthorpes in their master planning 
process. 
Sunday River Road 
P O Box 4S0 
Bethel Maine 04217 
207.824.3100 tel 
207.S24.S110 fax 
10) The Canyons will pay an additional $50,000 in lease payments for the 
term of the August 14th, 1996 agreement to the Osguthorpes in 
consideration for this agreement.. 
Both parties agree to work together in good faith and to maintain open 
communications. The Canyons accepts the obligation to notice and seek approval 
from the Osguthorpes on any matters of change to their lands. 
AGREED.. GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 2Sih day of July, 1997 
For The Canyons For the Osguthorpes 
Leslie B. Otten, President 
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort) 
Blaise Carrig, Managing Directed J Stey£ Osguthorpe 
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort) 
Menca. 
SWing 
pmpai] 
Kill'mpton, VT 
Sunday River, ME 
Sugarbush, VT 
Mount Snow, VT 
Haystack VT 
SugarloafAJSA, ME 
Attitash Bear Peak 
Pico. VT 
WITNESS: 
F> >"l_ *S?- </\—-/c IU & ' ° * - ^ ^?. 
(A^TCLO* ( . S/?Cct*/ 
Sunday River Road 
P O eox 450 
Bethel, Maine 0421 
207,824.8100 tel 
207.824.S110 fax 
ADDENDUM NO. 4 
The following agreament is a second amendment to the August 14,1996 agreement between Wolf Mountain 
(now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family. This agreement is in addition to the August 14, 1996 
agreement and the first amendment of My 2S4 1997. 
1) The Canyons wiB construct and maintain & work access road from the existing road at Red Pine Lake 
through the south end of section 3 towards the area known as Ninety Nine - 90. Steve Osguthorpe 
ar-d Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment of the road prior to constnicrioa 
2) The Canyons will be permitted to have alpine ski operations (consistent with their current operations) 
on the nonh side of Ninety Nine - 90 and through the southeast comer of section 3. 
3) In consideration for this agreement. The Canyons will pay an additionai $50,000.00 in lease payments 
for the term of August 14,1996 agreement. 
4) The Canyons acknowledges that under this Agreement, theAugust 14,1996 Agreement and the July 
28, 1997 first amendment to the August 14t 1996 Agreement, the Osguthorpe family and D.A. 
Osguthorpe have retained the right to use all of the property which is the subject of those 
Agreements, *as part of their ranch operation (tndudiag sheep and cattle) and to otherwise use and 
improve such property, so long a* such ranch operalion and other use and improvements do not 
damage the towers and oth^ facilities constructed on the property by the Canyons (and as 
predecessors in interest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the use of the property in the winter 
as part of the Canyons* winter skiing operations. The Canyons' agrees that the use of the properly 
by the Canyons' during the spring, summer, and fell, will not interfere with the ranch operations of 
the Osguthorpe family and D.A. Osguthorpe. 
Both parties agree to work together in good faith and maintain open communication. 
AGREED, G3RANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 10th day of August, 1998. 
For The Canyons For the Osguthorpe 
: Canig, Managing 
Director 
The Canyons 
D.A Osgutho: 
MF«tmiIyP< 
WITNESS 
- i?o^ 
*t 
^^Lv_ 
UL {M 
amcoy7\2J7H4-: 
